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Abstract 
This paper develops a coordination perspective on the firm. The basic idea is 
to combine insights in the division of labor with insights into the allocation of 
property rights.  Thus, a basic argument is that use rights over productive 
assets are necessary in order to accumulate the experience needed to perform 
improvements in production. Specialization in production accelerates the 
accumulation of skills from learning by doing in production. However, 
specialization introduces greater complexity and new kinds of tools and 
equipment and this in turn create uncertainty about the best way of 
coordinating the specialized and interdependent activities. The result may be 
bottlenecks in production and uneven development of components. 
Experimenting with the coordination of tasks is necessary in order to 
eliminate these problems. However, such experimentation is best facilitated 
by a certain structure of property rights. Coordination by direction provides a 
cheap way of conducting the experiments needed to collect information on 
how best to coordinate interdependent activities. 
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I. Introduction  
“Unfortunately”, Oliver Williamson (1985: 141) explains, “… the study of 
innovation is enormously complex”.  Therefore, he refrains from incorporating 
innovation and related issues − such as technical change, learning by doing, and 
changes in the division of labor − into his analysis of economic organization.  
Judging from the published output on the interaction between innovation, etc. and 
economic organization, most economists of organization have apparently agreed, 
although the works of Teece (1986) and Langlois and Robertson (1995) stand out as 
important exceptions. 
 Although the study of innovation is indeed complex, it is a main point of this 
paper that drawing upon key ideas of the innovation literature and related 
literatures allows for the development of a coordination perspective on the firm, one 
that is much more explicit about the production side of firms than is usual in the 
theory of economic organization.1   To be more specific, the present paper focuses 
attention on the issue of the accumulation of managerial knowledge that is 
required for the coordination of specialized production tasks.2  It is fair to say that 
economists of organization (e.g., formal “new” property rights theorists, 
transaction cost economists, principal-agent theorists) have paid relatively little 
attention to the production side of firms, including not only innovation, but also 
issues such as learning by doing, specialization, bottlenecks, and much else 
(Langlois and Foss 1999).   It is a key point of this paper that directing attention to 
such issues brings added insight in economic organization.   
                                                 
1 Although coordination, rather than the mitigation of problems stemming from opportunism and 
moral hazard, was key to Coase (1937) and later to Penrose (1959) (Loasby 1999, 2000), the issue has 
not received much attention in the recent economics of organization (Foss 1999). 
2 A production perspective on firms arguably encompasses many more issues than the one 
addressed in this paper.  For example, important issues may be how agents learn to conduct 
specialized production tasks, how specialized and partly tacit production knowledge is transferred 
between the agents who carry out the  production tasks, or how this type of production knowledge 
influence the choice between hierarchical planning of production activities or adaptation based 
more on team-based and local decisions.  While these are all interesting aspects of production,  a 
full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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 Specifically, I explore the issue of the existence and boundaries of the firm in 
the context of increasing division of labor, technological interdependencies and 
coordination advantages in production.3  Perhaps somewhat surprising to some 
readers, I shall draw on the property rights perspective as developed by Coase 
(1960), Alchian (1965), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Cheung (1983), and Barzel 
(1989) to focus and illuminate these issues.4 For example, I shall focus on how the 
allocation of use rights in a firm interacts with learning, incremental innovation, 
and specialization. When analysis concerns such issues, a micro-analytic 
perspective is required, and the property rights as developed by the above writers 
is one such perspective.  
 To get an idea of the main ideas of the analysis, briefly consider Coase (1937).  
Since this paper, we have known that the costs of coordination depend on the 
mode of coordination.  But as Coase pointed out, the advantages of the firm mode 
over the market mode diminish as marginal costs of coordination increase with 
more tasks being coordinated within the boundaries of a firm.  However, 
increasing marginal costs of coordination make room for competition between 
firms for the coordination of specialized tasks, creating a pattern of vertical 
specialization in the chain of production.  This reduces overall cost of coordination 
relative to both coordination within one firm and pure market coordination.  Now, 
Coase (1937) and virtually the whole of the post-Coasian economics of 
organization take the costs of coordinating various tasks as well as the extent of 
specialization in the economy as given and proceeds to analyze why not all 
transactions among specialized agents are coordinated in either firms or in open 
markets.  
                                                 
3 Note that in this paper I make a distinction between the division of labor and specialization. The 
former refers to the sub-division of tasks inside firms, while the latter refers to the allocation of 
tasks between firms.  See Richardson (1975). 
4 Note that these contributions differ in their thrust and insights from the more recent property 
rights perspective developed by Oliver Hart and his various co-workers (e.g., Grossman and Hart 
1986; Hart 1991, 1995) (for an analysis of the differences, see Foss and Foss 2000a,b).  Although I 
shall also make brief reference to the work of Hart, I concentrate mainly on the works of Coase, 
Alchian and Barzel. 
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 The point of departure in this paper is different, since I am interested in how 
continuous division of labor introduces new coordination problems and new 
opportunities for learning to coordinate the more specialized tasks through 
conducting experiments in production. In turn the accumulation of knowledge on 
how to coordinate more specialized tasks can bring down costs of production.  I 
argue that different modes of economic organization such as firm and market 
organization influence the cost of accumulating the relevant knowledge needed to 
bring down costs of coordinating the specialized tasks.  The existence and 
boundaries of the firm then may be understood in terms of low cost learning in 
coordination.5  In other words, as in Penrose (1959), production is seen as involving 
a discovery procedure, and some types of economic organization may be more 
efficient than other types for organizing different manifestations of this procedure.  
 The design of the paper is the following.  I begin from some well-known ideas 
about specialization and learning in production and argue that these ideas can be 
interpreted in terms of property rights.  For example, an agent’s learning is 
dependent on how extensive use rights he has to the various assets he controls.  
And specialization itself may be thought of as a subdivision of use rights over 
assets, so that each agent holds rights over a more narrow set of assets or holds a 
more narrowly defined set of rights over the same assets (Section II, “Specialization: 
a Property Rights Interpretation”). However, continuous division of labor may 
introduce technical uncertainty and give rise to bottlenecks and problems of 
uneven development of components, particularly in complex production systems.  
I shall argue that the Coasion notion of firms in which managers are granted rights 
of control to direct resources is one solution to such problems.  More specifically, 
the Coasian firm is a response to a combination of, one the one hand, ignorance 
about the best way of specifying rights and high measurement costs, which 
together result in imperfectly specified rights, and, on the other hand, high costs of 
                                                 
5 Langlois and Robertson (1995) have a related aim.   However, their approach is different from the 
one pursued here, since they are more taken up with analyzing continuous changes in transaction 
costs and the costs of making adaptation to unforeseen contingencies in the case of complex 
production systems. 
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re-contracting. This makes it desirable to rely on explicitly incomplete contracts 
and the firm is a superior structure for performing “controlled experiments” with 
complex production technologies (Section III, “Coordination in Production”).  
Finally, I briefly inquire into how these ideas connect to the issue of the boundaries 
of the firm (Section IV,  “Make or Buy Decisions: Taking Advantage of the Division of 
Labor”).    
 In sum, the contributions of this paper are, first, to give a novel interpretation 
of the meaning of specialization in production, second, to suggest some novel and 
dynamic mechanisms, drawn from the production side of firms, that are useful for 
understanding economic organization. and, third, to develop a notion of firms as 
experimenting entities.   
 
II. Specialization: a Property Rights Interpretation 
Specialization 
 As a preliminary definition, an increase in the division of labor in production 
can be described as dividing the production of goods into more narrowly defined 
sub-tasks.  The division of labor in production is, as Adam Smith pointed out in the 
first chapter of The Wealth of Nations, one of the main sources of productivity 
improvements.  Specifically, he ascribes productivity gains to three aspects of the 
division of labor, namely 1) improvements in a worker’s ability (“dexterity”) to 
perform a task as it is repeated more often; 2) the time that is saved from avoiding 
having to switch from one task to another (“sauntering”); and 3) an improved 
ability of a worker to identify labor saving innovations.  As Smith indicates, the 
subdivision of tasks is not the only characteristic of specialization; changes in tasks 
as new innovations are introduced are also important characteristics of the process 
of the “progressive division of labor” (cf. also Young 1928).  
  The division of labor and specialization in production are tightly 
interconnected themes. While the former refers to the subdivision of tasks involved 
 4
in the production of a certain good, the latter refers to the creation of production 
units specialized in the production of certain goods. The two types of 
specialization are interconnected; thus, Yang and NG (1995) argue that economies 
of specialization may arise from economies of labor specialization.6  However, in 
their model, economies of division of labor do not emerge gradually. The benefits 
are fully known ex-ante to the division of labor and specialization in production.  
This is in contrast to Becker and Murphy (1992) who emphasize that economies of 
labor specialization are both a consequence and a cause of specialization in 
production. 
 The above models are set out in an equilibrium framework.  The main 
concern of the authors is to establish the equilibrium amount of specialization 
under different assumptions about increasing returns to division of labor.  The 
concern here is different, since the aim is to argue that coordination problems in 
complex production systems – indicating disequilibrium situations – are under 
certain conditions best handled by the firm and that the boundaries of the firm are 
also influenced by a changing division of labor.  In other words, the benefits from 
an increased division of labor reveal themselves gradually as agents improve 
dexterity in carrying out the tasks and as the problems of how to coordinate the 
more specific and interdependent tasks are gradually solved. Moreover, the 
division of labor can never be completed in a short time, since both the 
accumulation of knowledge needed to solve the coordination problems and the 
identification of benefits from a further division of labor takes time. Thus, the 
choice between firm and market organization of tasks change as the tasks change 
and as knowledge of how to coordinate the specialized tasks is accumulated and 
new opportunities for further division of labor is discovered. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Not all writers in this area distinguish between  the division of labor and specialization. Adam 
Smith and Allyn Young did not.   Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Learning by Doing 
 The idea that learning by doing underlies productivity growth was 
reintroduced in economics by Kenneth Arrow (1962) in a famous paper that 
anticipates much of the recent “new growth theory” (Romer 1986).  He suggested 
that the growth of knowledge that underlies economic growth could partly be 
explained as a function of learning in production, and that technical change  
... can be ascribed to experience, that is, it is the very activity of 
production which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses 
are selected over time” (p.156).  
 Moreover, Arrow argued that learning associated with repetition of tasks is 
subject to diminishing returns, so that continuous improvements in dexterity are 
dependent upon continuous changes in the tasks.  Clearly, such changes may stem 
from innovations that may be a result of increased experience in production.  
 That hands-on experience in production is a source of innovativeness is also 
an important overall conclusion that can be drawn from numerous studies of 
innovation and technological change (Rosenberg 1976; Sahal 1981; Nelson and 
Winter 1982).  These studies point to the fact that the nature of activities and the 
characteristics of the techniques in use tend to focus attention on certain technical 
problems.  For example, Rosenberg argues that most incremental improvements in 
products and production processes are closely connected to their physical 
characteristics.  He uses the term “technological imperatives” to indicate how some 
opportunities for technological development present themselves as more or less 
evident. Complex technologies, he argues, create internal compulsions and 
pressures  (i.e., “focusing devices”) that focus attention on the elimination of 
bottlenecks in productions and incompatibilities in products.  
 In a much-cited contribution, Devendra Sahal (1981) presented a similar but 
more elaborated characterization of the sources of innovative opportunities. 
According to Sahal, technological development leads to the formation of systems 
where the increased complexity from the mutually dependent components sets the 
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boundaries for further development. He examines the different types of innovative 
activity that underlie this kind of technological development. For example, he 
explains how changes in the scale of a complex production system are particularly 
likely to create problems requiring innovative responses.  These problems may be 
divided into three kinds: 1) Problems due to uneven development in the 
components of the technology; 2) problems that arise because of the need for new 
materials; and 3) problems caused by a more complex structure of technology.  
Solving these problems result in innovations that change the structure of the 
product or the production process, introduce new materials, or combine different 
technologies into a new system with a more simple structure allowing for further 
improvements. 
 Three conclusions of interest in the present context emerge from the above-
mentioned literature. First, productivity gains often stem from a combination of 
improved dexterity and innovativeness.  Second, improved dexterity as well as 
innovativeness is a function of experience in production.  Third, productivity gains 
from innovations in, for example, the structure of technology or materials, and 
reductions of bottlenecks in production are based on experience that is shaped by 
the nature of the activities that are undertaken, and is thus specific to those 
activities.   
 The division of labor in production influences the scope for learning by doing 
on the part of individuals, because it implies that their accumulation of experience 
in production is limited to more specialized tasks.  However, there is a trade-off 
here between the depth of learning and the scope of learning, since specialization 
also implies that, as tasks are repeated more often, deeper learning results.  
Moreover, specialization results in faster learning of skills. The division of labor − 
by focusing the attention of individuals on much a more narrow set of tasks − may 
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improve the rate of innovativeness with respect to the discovery of new ways of 
carrying out a task, or of improving tools and materials that are used.7
 However, as I shall explain more thoroughly later, specialization in 
production may also create problems of bottlenecks and problems from uneven 
development of components.  Of course, such problems reduce the benefits from 
specialization, unless some mechanism for coordinating the interdependent 
specialized tasks is implemented.  Before I turn to a discussion of coordination, I 
discuss the relation between specialization, allocation of property rights and 
learning by doing.  
 
Property Rights 
 The kind of property rights theory that is utilized in this paper is that 
associated with writers such as Coase (1960), Alchian (1965), Demsetz (1967), 
Cheung (1969, 1983), and Barzel (1989).  It is important to stress that although the 
insights of these authors were all developed in the context of neoclassical price 
theory, their basic insights relating to, for example, different notions of property 
rights, are not logically committed to basic neoclassical assumptions, such as fully 
informed maximization and continuous market-clearing.  Thus, basic property 
rights ideas are fully consistent with the emphasis on uncertainty, complexity, 
disequilibrium, and experimentation adopted in the present paper. 
 As is well known, the property rights approach emerged from the insight that 
the objects of exchange are not assets per se, but rather the rights to those assets 
(Coase 1960). Property rights are the rights agents hold over assets, such as 
physical, human, financial, and intellectual property assets.  More specifically, 
private property rights include the following kinds of rights (Alchian 1965; 
Eggertson 1990): 
                                                 
7 The ability to solve technical problems may also depend on specialized technical and/or scientific 
knowledge.  Becker and Murphy (1992) models this as exogenous defined increases in the marginal 
return from investments in the knowledge needed to carry out increasingly specialized tasks.    
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1. Use rights, which define the potential uses of an asset. 
2.  Income rights, or the right to consume an asset.  
3.  Rights to exclude non-owners from access to assets. 
4.  Rights to transfer permanently to another party all the above mentioned rights 
over an asset − that is, to alienate or sell an assets. 
 Contracts, whether formal or informal, are used to define the rights to be 
transferred and the terms of transfer of rights. The exchange of rights is not 
costless.  For example, often physical and human assets have different properties 
and may sometimes yield a number of different services depending on how the 
assets are used.  In principle, although not in practice, each one of the properties 
and different uses of assets that are known to the transacting parties could be 
specified and be subject to negotiations between parties to a transaction.  
Moreover, use rights over different properties or uses of assets may be shared 
between individuals (Barzel 1989).  To specify and to contract over the different 
possible uses of assets, which are known to the transacting parties, are clearly 
costly actions − more precisely, they involve transaction costs.  In the property 
rights framework, transaction costs are conceptualized as the costs due to the 
”transfer, capture and protection of rights” (Barzel 1989: 2).  When such costs exist, 
not all known uses of assets will be specified in contracts. 
 An important characteristic of property rights is the degree of preciseness 
with which they are delineated.  For example, one may distinguish between specific 
and residual rights (Barzel 1989; Hart 1995).  Specific rights are those rights that are 
specified in contracts and allocated between the transacting parties before any 
transaction takes place.  Residual rights are those rights that are not constrained by 
stipulations in contracts or by the law.  Both use and income rights can be either 
specific or residual.  Residual income rights (i.e. residual claims) are the non-
specified income or pleasure a person can enjoy from using or alienating an asset 
(including his labor).   Rights and obligations may be more or less clearly defined.   
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For example, if all rights were truly perfectly defined, according to the Coase 
theorem (Coase 1960), this literally means that 
• all possible uses of assets are fully known 
• all returns from all uses of all assets are perfectly known 
• all legitimate and illegitimate uses of assets are perfectly specified  
• all this is perfectly enforceable.   
 If all rights are completely defined in this way, there cannot, by definition, 
arise any conflicts over the use of scarce resources or the returns from assets nor 
can any discoveries from learning by doing take place. All uses are already 
discovered and individuals do not need to have any discretion in the use of 
resources.  Of course, this is a highly unrealistic situation.  In actuality, all rights 
are far from perfectly defined.  
 The distinction between specific and residual rights is not completely clear-
cut.   Sometimes only the right to decide between different kinds of uses of an asset 
is described as residual rights while rights to decide how to use an assets in a 
specific way is described as discretion (Alchian and Woodward 1988).  High 
information costs and ignorance often imply that transacting parties voluntarily 
leave rights over certain properties of an asset unspecified. For example, to 
completely specify all rights to use a computer requires full knowledge of all 
possible uses and all the different ways in which the computer may be operated, as 
well as a detailed listing of these uses. In addition, one would need to perform a 
tight surveillance of the users of the computer in order to enforce one’s rights. 
Many rights over a computer are therefore left unspecified, and the user of the 
computer is then capable of exercising some discretion in his decisions on how to 
use or operate the computer.8   
 Finally, rights to decide between some pre-specified uses of assets may be 
delegated to others (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Aghion and Tirole 1995).  Rights to 
                                                 
8 As long as there is incentive compatibility, in the sense that discretionary behavior does not favor 
one party at the expense of another, rights most likely will remain unspecified. 
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specify specific rights over physical assets, delegate and otherwise transfer rights 
over assets follow from formal ownership over assets, and in the case of labor from 
voluntary agreements to transfer these rights.  In the following sections, I use the 
term “specific rights” to denote only the situation where rights are delineated in 
ways which do not allow for discretionary behavior. If discretionary behavior 
occurs, this is because some rights have been imperfectly specified or enforced.  
The difference between having discretion and holding residual rights over assets is 
that the latter case includes rights to unilaterally re-define and re-allocate (by 
delegation or otherwise) rights over assets which are not specified in contracts.  
 Traditionally the literature on economic organization has focused on 
transaction costs as the reason for discretion and residual rights.  Notably, the 
argument is that the employment contract is left partly open because of 
prohibitively high costs of specifying in detail all rights and obligations of the 
employee in all future conceivable situations. Related to this, the authority relation 
is seen as arising from the presence of transaction costs, because in the presence of 
such costs, incomplete contracts can give rise to conflicts and disagreements over 
the uses of assets (Williamson 1985).  Assigning the right to decide how assets 
should be used in situations that are not covered by the contract is often a low-cost 
way of resolving this problem.  
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 There is also another but in the literature on economic organization often 
neglected reason why rights may not be perfectly defined and why employment 
contracts are used. Agents may be ignorant of all the possible uses of assets. 
However, some agents may expect that new uses of assets can be discovered, for 
example, in learning by doing fashion and that such discoveries will be profitable.9
 
The Division of Labor, Learning by Doing, and Property Rights  
 Given the preceding discussions of specialization and property rights, we 
may now combine these insights and conceptualize an increase in the division of 
labor in production in terms of property rights. A subdivision of use rights over assets, 
so that each agent engaged in production holds use rights over a more narrow set of assets 
or holds a more narrow set of use rights over the same assets.  The latter case may imply 
that use rights over an asset are shared between individuals.  The one kind of 
specialization does not preclude the other.   
 It should be noted that the kind of assets over which one holds use rights 
need not be the same with division of labor as without. In many instances an 
increase in the division of labor and specialization is accompanied by a shift from 
all-purpose tools to more specialized equipment.  However, the introduction of 
more specific equipment and tools limits rights, because these have fewer different 
uses.  
 There is a connection between learning by doing and use rights.  This 
connection is a consequence of the fact that learning by doing requires the exercise 
of use rights over assets.  Moreover, the better-specified and easily monitored use 
                                                 
9 Both the choice between different types of contracts and the structure of the contracts are seen as 
reflecting transaction costs only. Thus, stipulation in contracts of the types of services and the terms 
at which they are to be provided reflects the costs of drafting the contract, costs of monitoring and 
enforcing the stipulations and the efficient risk sharing. Ignorance of the kind of services that may 
be needed  or can be provided is usually not included as an essential feature of the choice. One 
exception is Steven Cheung (1969) who argue that agents tend to choose more firm like 
(employment contracts) if they know that they do not know today what services they may need 
tomorrow.  This is also Brian Loasby’s interpretation of Coase (see Loasby 1999, 2000). 
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rights are, the less able are those who use assets to experiment and the more 
constrained is their learning.  If, for example, the manner in which a computer 
operator runs a program is pre-specified in a contract and easily monitored, his 
learning by doing may be limited to improving the speed with which he activates 
the keyboard.  If he has greater discretion in deciding how to operate the program, 
he might have a greater opportunity for learning by experimenting. Such 
experimentation may result in labor saving innovations of the kind envisaged by 
Adam Smith and, perhaps, today by proponents of “the learning organization”. 10  
 However, discretionary behavior need not always result in productivity 
gains. This may, for example, be the case if there is strong technological 
interdependencies, so that the functional performance11 of a technology is greatly 
influence by the fit between parts and/or between activities. In such a case, 
discretionary behavior may result in bottlenecks or in uneven development of 
components. Basically these problems arise when those who deliver parts or carry 
out activities are not aware of the need for mutual adjustment between parts and 
activities. These problems can be ascribed to imperfectly specified rights over 
assets.  
 High information and enforcement costs provide a reason why not all rights 
are well specified; however, ignorance is another equally good reason why rights 
                                                 
10 Improvements in dexterity and innovativeness do not come about unless individuals also have 
the incentives to bring about these improvements. How these incentives are provided is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, notice that with higher degrees of discretion an individual also has 
more room for shirking or otherwise appropriate a greater value from the use of an asset. The 
allocation of residual income rights from the use of an asset can be a powerful mean of reducing 
such rent-seeking behavior. Team problems (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) is an example of problems 
which arise because individuals have discretion.  A similar problem exists in the production of 
complex products with may parts where it is only possible to test the quality of the product if all 
components are in place and working (David 1987). Each supplier of parts may then have 
incentives to exercise discretion and shirk on the quality of their output. In these cases a more 
complete realization of the advantages of specialization in production may require specialization in 
monitoring. 
11 I use the term “functional performance of a technology” in accordance with Sahal (1981) as the 
objectively measured performance of a technology. As examples Sahal mentions the thermal 
efficiency of an electric power plant defined as the ratio of the electrical to the total thermal output 
of the fuel or the horse-power -hour per gallon of fuel or the horse-power-to-weight ratio of a 
tractor.  
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are left unspecified.12 In this connection it is important to note that ignorance may 
be linked to increased division of labor in production and that such ignorance may 
be reflected in bottlenecks and uneven development of components.  For example, 
it may take time to discover how best to sequence or conduct various activities 
when subdivision of rights over assets leads to increased complexity and 
interdependence between tasks. Moreover, specialization and growth of markets 
may give way for the introduction of new kinds of specialized tools and large scale 
equipment which in turn may introduce new problems of how to utilize capacity 
effectively (Ames and Rosenberg 1965; Leijonhufvud 1986). Finally, when 
ignorance is a characteristic of the process of redefining tasks and implementing 
new equipment, it is likely that some individuals will come to enjoy too large 
degrees of discretion in their exercise of use rights so that the conduction of their 
various tasks become uncoordinated. This, in turn, may result in innovations that 
may cause uneven development of tools, equipment and components.  
 Problems of bottlenecks and uneven development of components thus arise 
because many of the valuable dimensions of assets only become apparent from 
experimenting with the use of the assets. This make it is difficult or perhaps even 
impossible to specify all valued dimensions and uses of assets prior to an increase 
in the division of labor.13 Even if important dimensions can be specified it may be 
difficult to allocate these specific rights in ways which ensure the best use of assets.  
This may, for example, be the case with the time and place dimension of assets 
where some allocations result in excess stocks of intermediate products or in idle 
assets. 
                                                 
12 Thus, the preciseness with which use rights are specified depend on the benefit in terms of 
learning from discretionary actions on the one hand and the costs that may arise due to moral 
hazard and  a lack of coordination on the other hand. Finally this is  subject to the constraints of 
knowledge of  the various uses and the transaction costs involved in specifying and monitoring the 
various tasks. 
13  To confuse matters a bit the elimination of bottlenecks may imply the implementation of a 
technique in which many previously separate tasks are integrated into one production step. 
However, often knowledge based on learning in coordination is embodied into the technology. 
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 Solving problems that arise from technological interdependencies is an 
important source of innovative improvements (as pointed out by Rosenberg 1976 
and Sahal 1981).  However, such innovations do not emerge because of increased 
division of labor, but because of an ongoing learning with respect to coordination 
of tasks. From the literature on innovation studies it appears that much of this 
learning depends on the accumulation of hands on experience from experimenting 
whit different ways of laying out production tasks.  The question then arises: What 
institutional set-up best provides for experimentation and accumulation of 
experience in the coordination of tasks?   
 In the following section I argue that the solution to coordination problems 
which manifest themselves as bottlenecks and uneven development of components 
is the Coasian firm in which managers (and/or owners) direct the use of resources. 
I also argue that the one important function of the Coasian firm in a specialized 
economy can be ascribed to its ability to reduce the transaction costs involved in 
setting up and conducting experiment. In situations characterized by high 
measurement costs and ignorance the high costs of recontracting will making it 
desirable to rely on explicitly open-ended contracts rather than seemingly complete 
contracts. In other words, with boundedly rational agents and technological 
uncertainty, there may be economic gains from experimenting in coordination and 
such experimentation may require the flexibility afforded by an open-ended 
contract for the provision of labor services and possibly combined with legal 
ownership of physical assets.   
 
III. Coordination and Experimentation in Production 
The need for social coordination arises as a consequence of interdependencies in 
consumption, between consumption and production and between production 
activities. These interdependencies follow from conflicting preferences over scarce 
resources or from technological interdependencies.  Traditional price theory 
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informs us that under certain restrictive assumption, including the assumption of 
perfectly defined rights and zero transaction costs, prices provide sufficient 
information to choose between different uses of resources in a manner that at the 
same time optimize the utility of individuals and ensure social coordination, 
leaving no valuable resources idle. Firms in this stylized world simply are 
specialized units of production that produce for outsiders (Demsetz 1995: 8).14  
Their “coordination tasks” consists of selecting the profit-maximizing quantities of 
inputs and outputs for the specialized production tasks they each carry out.  In this 
world, there is no need for firms to consider the question of make or buy, since 
with perfect price information there are no gains from organizing one more or one 
less specialized task within a firm. 
 
Specialization and Coordination  
 It is, however, a commonplace notion that there is a trade-off between the 
advantages from specialization and the costs of coordinating increasingly 
specialized tasks. One likely explanation of this is that real world markets do not 
function as smoothly as portrayed in the neoclassical price theory. The use of real 
world markets may be particularly costly when further division of labor creates 
new unknown technological interdependencies that result in bottlenecks and 
uneven development of components.  
Problems of bottlenecks and uneven development of components exist even if 
total self-sufficiency prevailed, since individuals producing for their own needs 
may be unaware of how best to carry out an activity or how to develop the 
technologies they use.  The division of labor and specialization in production, 
however, is likely to magnify the problems because mutual adjustments now 
                                                 
14  As Loasby (2000) points out, the problem with this view is that it implicitly assumes that the 
existence of markets requires no explanation.  To adequately deal with this issue would, however, 
require another paper. 
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require awareness of what other individuals are doing.15  If, in addition the 
functionality of a technology is strongly dependent on the external conditions for 
carrying out the tasks, there may be a permanent need for mutual adjustments. As 
knowledge is accumulated from learning by doing new ways of specifying use 
rights will emerge. In fact, the process of discovery in an learning by doing fashion 
may itself require continuous adaptation that involve the redefinition and 
reallocation of use rights between the agents. 
  With an extensive division of labor and strong interdependence between 
tasks it may be economically efficient to rely on a centrally developed and directed 
experimental set up rather than on decentralized negotiations over different 
experimental set ups. Decentralized negotiations and specialization in production 
makes it is necessary to obtain the consent of many parties, each holding a sub-set 
of rights over the relevant assets needed to operate the technology in order to 
continually reallocate or re-delineate rights in a way that improves the functional 
performance of technologies. Therefore, when further divisions of labor introduces 
technological independence in production, reaching coordination requires the 
utilization of a complementary institution to arm-length markets transactions in 
order to solve the problems of mutual adjustment between individuals carrying 
out interdependent tasks.  It shall be argued that the Coasian firm is such an 
institution. 
 
                                                 
15  The benchmark for improving coordination by re-arranging rights over human and physical 
assets could be the functional performance of a technology without specialization in production. 
However, a comparison of the functional performance of technologies in situation of specialization 
and no specialization is complicated by the fact that it is most likely not the same technologies 
which are used in both situation. A comparison between the coordination that could have been 
achieved in a perfect (Walrasian) market characterized by a given degree of specialization and 
given technologies is another possible solution. However, in a timeless world of zero transaction 
costs there are only very few limits to the division of labor and tasks are likely be very specialized. 
To derive the optimal coordination by comparing an unrealistic Walrasian market model with a 
real situation is to commit an error that may result in too great investments in improving 
coordination. All one can say then is that an investment in the improvement in coordination is 
efficient if the resources invested in bringing about the improvement is the best possible investment 
at the time at which it is contemplated.  
 17
A Property Rights Perspective on “The Nature of the Firm” 
 Since the publication of “The Nature of the Firm”, increasing attention has 
indeed been focused on how costs of coordination vary with the mode of 
coordination, with firms being an alternative coordination mechanism to the 
market mechanism.  Here I interpret Coase´s analysis of the nature of the firm in 
terms of property rights.  I argue that Coase’s notion of firms can be viewed as a 
solution to problems of coordination in situations where use rights over assets 
cannot be perfectly specified and allocated in manners which ensures the 
functionality of technologies.  Such situations may occur because individuals face 
uncertainty and because they have only limited computational capacity making it 
to difficult for them to specify use rights in ways that solve problems of 
interdependencies ex-ante to a further division of labor.  One of the reasons why 
managed coordination may be advantageous to price coordination is because the 
former reduces the costs of learning to coordinate technologically interdependent 
tasks. 
 Coase (1937) uses coordination costs to explain why in an economy with a 
given degree of specialization in production markets and firms co-exist as 
alternative modes of coordination.  The reason for the existence of firms is that 
there are costs of using the price mechanism and that “[t]he most obvious cost of 
“organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what 
the relevant prices are” (Coase 1937: 21; my emph.).  With high market cost (later 
termed transaction costs), the market mode of coordination is substituted by a firm 
mode of co-ordination based on managerial decisions.  While Coase (1937) does 
not explicitly suggest that uncertainty is a reason why it may be costly to discover 
“the relevant prices” or why managed direction may be less costly than open 
market transactions, uncertainty seem to play an important role in his explanation 
of the need of open-ended contracts such as employment contracts.  According to 
Coase an employment contract is preferred “… owing to the difficulty of 
forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity 
or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person 
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purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do” (Coase 
1937: 21).   
 Stated in the terminology of property rights there are high costs of specifying 
the valued attributes of assets in all future states; this results in some rights over 
valued attributes of assets being left unspecified.  When the coordination between 
factors is subject to changes in external factors (contingencies) that cannot be 
specified ex ante, continuos redirection of resources and re-planning taking 
advantage of the dimensions of time and place of assets will be necessary in order 
to avoid bottlenecks.16 17 Managed direction of resources may thus substitute for 
price direction of resources when parties to transactions realize that contingencies 
of different sorts may interrupt the timing and sequencing of interdependent 
activities (for a recent treatment, see Wernerfelt 1997).  
 An arbitrageur holding stocks of assets also makes his money from superior 
knowledge about the value of the unspecified attributes of time and place. The 
employment contract could be interpreted as providing a stock of labor services 
that within limits could be allocated to different uses by the direction of a manager 
in response to unforeseen contingencies (Coase 1937).  Managers then play the role 
of arbitrageurs holding stocks of labor services in order to take advantages of 
superior knowledge of the time and place property of labor services. 
                                                 
16 Bargaining as a way of determining the prices may be very costly if each contingent plan involves 
many interdependent tasks that require close contacts between those who carry out the activities. 
As explained by Rosen (1991) in the case of team effects (joint production), a pricing scheme which 
solves the coordination problem of time and place will be extremely complex to work out. 
Moreover, “...to calculate and implement this solution requires full knowledge of the underlying 
technology and productivity of team members in the first place” (p.81). And since errors in prices 
can be more costly than errors in the allocation of activities and time, it may be advantageous to 
rely on a manager to perform the allocation of time and workers to tasks and then let the manager 
monitor the activities. The importance of managerial direction diminishes if the technology 
becomes fully known to all.   
17 In a system of production the timing of a particular sequence of activities is a way of reducing 
costs of idle labor or machinery and costs due to the building up of stocks of intermediate products. 
The advantage to tighter integration of different steps in the process is the costs saved on stocks 
and idle resources. These advantages have to be measured against the cost of failure or 
irregularities in strongly interdependent systems. Firms therefore may hold stocks of input in order 
to reduce these latter costs. 
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 Now, arbitrageurs only need to bear the cost of stocks if they can not 
appropriate the benefits of their knowledge of time and place by selling this 
information. Two factors may explain why it is not always feasible to sell 
information about time and place dimensions of assets. First, there is the well-
known problem of information as a public good which, if revealed before the 
transaction, cannot be protected from capture (Arrow, 1962). Secondly, 
negotiations may take longer time than direction by orders and because of this, the 
opportunity for profitable action may be gone.18   
 However, to Coase high costs of discovering the relevant contingencies are 
not a sufficient factor in explaining why firms exist because for each unforeseen 
contingency one discovers one might be able to negotiate a new contract. 
Therefore, firms exist only if there is also “... costs of negotiating and concluding a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction that takes place on a market (ibid.: 
21). These costs are reduced “… if the factor, for a certain remuneration (which 
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the direction of an entrepreneur within 
certain limits (ibid.: 21, emph. in original).   Coase (1937) thus, used the employer-
employee relationship as the archetype of the firm where managers rights to direct 
resources within certain limits provide a low cost way of filling the holes in the 
open-ended employment contract. 
 Much later, Coase (1991) observed that already at the time when he wrote 
”The Nature of the Firms”, he was aware that the analogy between the 
employment contract and the firm could give an incomplete picture of the nature 
of the firm.  For one thing “... a firm may imply control over another person’s 
property as well as over their labor” (p.64), an amendment which figured in a 
footnote of the original paper indicating that firms may also posses use rights over 
rented assets.  Coase (1991), however, also points to a second amendment to the 
                                                 
18 In some productions, time is not just valuable but in fact critical to the quality of products. In pea 
production for example, the timing of harvest is very important in order to fulfill the goals of high 
capacity utilizing of the pea processing equipment and avoid quality losses from perishability of 
peas. For the harvest period, pea processing firms therefore may acquire from the farmers of peas 
the use rights over peas and fields in order to plan and decide on all matters concerning the harvest 
of peas. 
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original article. He draws attention to a lecture note from 1934 in which he states 
that “… a full firm relationship will not come about unless several such 
(incomplete) contracts are made with people and for things which cooperate with 
one another” (Coase 1991: 64). The latter amendment can be interpreted to mean 
that managerial decisions fill the holes of open-ended contracts in cases where 
coordination of large number of factors that cooperate with each other is required.  
This is exactly the situation that comes into existence when further divisions of 
labor in production result in technological interdependencies between many tasks.  
 
 The inability to specify future states of the world, need not be the only 
explanation of why managed coordination is preferred to price coordination.  The 
importance of managed direction of interdependent assets may also be motivated 
by endogenously created technological uncertainty, which arises when further division 
of labor alters tasks and create new unknown interdependencies between tasks. 
For example, the complexity of technologies may make it difficult to know in 
advance the particular requirements for efficient coordination.  In fact, with a great 
deal of interdependence in a complex system, the best time and place to use an 
asset depend on the specification for the uses of all other assets that are needed in 
the production. Managed coordination is therefore important even if there are no 
unforeseeable contingencies that require adjustment in tasks. Firms thus exist as 
parallel institutions to markets in order to capture the value of the unspecified attributes of 
assets.19
                                                 
19  Ownership of assets, however, may also be a cheap way of internalizing externalities.  When an 
owner wants to enjoy the benefits of labor specialization he is required to delegate use rights to 
agents.  If he has full knowledge of all the uses of the assets that he owns and of all the 
consequences of the various uses he can delegate use rights in ways that minimize the negative 
(economic) consequences of externalities. To avoid some of the costs of externalities which arise 
with interdependent activities and team production managers may “regulate” the use of assets 
within firms by for example, defining strict limits of authority of decision takers or by simply 
forbidding certain uses of assets. To the  extent that he is unaware of all the possible externalities an 
owner/manager will have to conduct various experiments not only in ways of producing but also 
in the selective grant of authority. 
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 To sum up, firms exists only if there is both high costs of discovering the 
relevant prices and if these costs cannot be reduced by contracting for this 
information. The latter may be the case where there are numerous 
interdependencies between owners of resources. This makes it costly to carry out 
the needed rearrangement of tasks to take advantage of new information about 
states of the world. Firms then save transaction costs by substituting many 
independently determined contingent contracts by managed directions. This may 
be taken to be the essence of Coase (1937). To this I add the transaction cost that 
may be saved when endogenously created technological uncertainty and 
complexity require sequential delineation and reallocation of rights over assets as a 
way of gradually improving the functional performance of technologies. The role 
of a managers thus are different from that of an arbitrageurs since the former 
engage in learning activities that involve the experimentation with different 
allocations of use rights in order to discover profit opportunities. 
 For managed direction of resources to be efficient, it is required that 
managers are at least as qualified in discovering the relevant prices (that is, find the 
opportunity costs of different uses of assets) as independent contractors would be.  
Otherwise, costs of transacting may be saved at the expense of efficiency in the use 
of resources.  If managers have better knowledge or information about the valuable 
uses of resources compared to other agents, managers have a natural ownership 
advantage over resources.  Such an advantage explains the single person firm, but 
not necessarily why managers in order to take advantage of this knowledge hire 
employees who are prepared to take orders within certain limits.  “Managers” 
could as well rent the labor time of another agent in return for the exercise of 
certain well-specified task. 
 Arguably, managers stand a good chance of acquiring superior information 
about the opportunity costs of different use rights over assets that make up a 
complex technology.  From the literature on incremental innovations, it is apparent 
that the solution to problems of bottlenecks and uneven development in 
components are based on experience in production and development.  I shall now 
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argue that this experience is probably more easily accumulated within the 
boundaries of firms.  
 One might expect this learning process to be less costly to organize within 
rather than across the boundaries of firms because managers, who hold residual 
rights over assets ⎯ including rights to re-define and reallocate specific rights ⎯ 
are able to conduct controlled experiments without continuously having to re-
negotiate contracts. This saves time and ink-costs. Moreover, due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the outcome of various experimental set-ups, independent contractors 
will have different subjective valuations of different experimental strategies that 
can be pursued.  This is likely to complicate the bargaining process.20  In contrast, 
within a firm managers can unilaterally create a “controlled” experiment in which 
they only change some aspects of the tasks in order to trace the effects of some 
specific re-arrangements of rights. Finally, coordinating interdependent tasks 
within the boundaries of a firm may provide managers with a more complete 
picture of the nature of interdependencies. This information is not only important 
in relation to eliminating bottlenecks, but also in relation to avoiding problems of 
uneven development of components by setting up interface standards and other 
more permanent solutions. 
 
Other Determinants of the “Costs of Discovering the Relevant Prices” 
 In the previous section uncertainty and complexity were seen as determinants 
of the costs of discovering “the relevant prices.”  As many contributions to the 
economics of organization have made clear, there may be many other reasons why 
there are high costs of discovering the relevant prices and some of these reasons 
may become more predominant with increased specialization in production.  
Different modern theories of the firm put emphasis on different costs of transacting 
⎯ such as measurement costs, contracting costs and costs of enforcing rights over 
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assets ⎯ in explaining the existence and boundaries of firms.  This section provides 
a brief overview of some of the various arguments presented in the literature, and 
relates them to the arguments of this paper. 
 Taken by them selves high costs of discovering what the relevant prices are 
need not require the existence of firms.   For example, high measurement costs may 
make it costly to determine the valued characteristics of assets and this may cause 
problems of excess sorting and of shirking on quality (Barzel 1982).  Managed 
direction of assets may not always be the most effective means of solving such 
problems.  Other arrangements, such as product guarantees, quality classes and 
investments in brand name capital are often better suited.  However, specialization 
in production may create other kinds of problems related to high measurement 
costs.  One of the advantages of specialization between production and 
consumption is the ability to take advantage of economies of scale in equipment.  
In order to realize such advantages, many individuals may have to cooperate in 
order to operate the equipment.  If tasks are not perfectly specified in terms of each 
individual’s rights to use different attributes of the equipment or if such rights 
cannot be enforced, it is possible that each individual will exercise discretion and 
try to gain at the expense of others.  
 If, for example, it is difficult to determine how much the operation of each 
individual contributes to the wear and tear of the equipment there is a problem of 
common property and this imply that there is likely to be insufficient incentives for 
investments in maintenance.21 Therefore according to Barzel (1989), “[a]ttributes 
susceptible to serious common-property problems, such as equipment lubrication, 
will tend to be owned by organizations created to control these problems” (p.58). 
One way of controlling such problems, which involves an organization, is to use a 
                                                                                                                                                     
20 In this connection wage contracts may be an efficient way of sharing risks from experimenting, 
putting the entire burden of risk on the shoulders of those who carry out experiments (cf. Knight 
1921). 
21 As explained by Barzel (1989) the common property problem disappears if the equipment is 
scaled down to fit a single operator producing an identifiable output. Some mean of coordinating 
individual operators is still needed but with each producing an identifiable output contracting in 
market may provide the coordination. 
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fixed wage contract in which workers are remunerated for their time rather than 
their output. But workers receiving specific income for a specific amount of time 
have no incentives to devise ways of exercising use rights over assets that would 
generate utility.  Thus, when fixed wage contracts are used, monitoring of effort 
will be needed to induce effort and managers will have to specify the tasks to be 
performed (Barzel 1989). 
 Specialization in production creates a similar problem if there are high costs 
of determining the level of effort provided by individuals.  In particular, where co-
operation in teams is needed between different individuals in order to realize rents 
on their labor services from producing a given output, problems of common 
property may occur. This is because each individual is able to exercise discretion in 
providing his labor services but only bears part of the costs. The solution to such 
team problems is to set up an organization that will economize on metering costs 
and an allocation of rewards which is more in accord with the effort delivered 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972).22 A monitor specializing23 in metering effort and 
holding rights to residual income, to alter membership of the team and to sell all 
their rights may provide such a solution.   
 A second type of explanation of why firms exist emphasizes how high 
information costs or uncertainty makes it difficult to enforce one’s rights over 
assets (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Hart 
(1991,1995).  According to this literature, there is a strong correlation between asset 
specificity and contracting failure, and this causes inefficiencies because valuable 
                                                 
22 According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) team production is production in which “ 1) several 
types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each 
cooperating resource. An additional factor creates a team organization problem - not all resources 
used in team production belong to one person” (p.779). The separate ownership over resource is 
motivated by such factors as risk aversion, the prohibition of slavery and sunk costs investments 
which make short term ownership to costly. However, the separation of ownership could also have 
been motivated by the possibility of realizing advantages of specialization in accumulating 
different complementary skills of production.     
23 Monitoring means to “… measure output performance, apportioning rewards, observing the 
input behavior of inputs as means of detecting or estimating their marginal productivity and giving 
assignments or instruction in what to do and how to do it” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 782; my 
emphasis).  However, the reason for the latter kind of activity is left unexplained. 
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transactions involving investments in transaction specific assets is not completed.  
In particular, it is assumed that; high costs of planning for all various 
contingencies; of describing future states and of communicating these plans to a 
third party makes it impossible to write complete contracts. Therefore, one cannot 
safeguard one’s investments in specific assets with the aid of a third party 
(typically a court).  
 Specialization in production may make investments in specialized equipment 
and in specialized knowledge which have no alternative value outside a particular 
relation attractive.  According to incomplete contract theories, undertaking such 
investments requires vertical integration so that firms can take on the role of 
enforcer of contracts.  Willliamson (1985), for example, describes firms as their own 
ultimate court of appeal.   To Hart, the physical assets over which a legitimate 
owner has formal residual use rights define firms. Having residual use rights over 
assets provides the owner with a mean of enforcing contracts that would not be 
possible if transactions took place between different owners of assets. 
 These different explanations of firms have in common the idea that the best 
uses of resources are already known.  This is because they take production theory 
as a appropriate for describing production, and thus assumes public knowledge of 
production sets and the availability of all relevant skills required for production 
(Langlois and Foss 1999; Loasby 1999).  The problem is “simply” how to provide 
the right incentives for efficient exploitation of or investment in the assets in 
question.  Monitoring and more advanced incentive schemes --than those that can 
be devised for re-contracting between independent individuals (with definite time 
horizons)-- help overcome such problems. However, direction by order giving is 
not a central element in the solution and the possibilities of learning to coordinate 
tasks is limited to improving one’s skills as a monitor. 
 Each one of the above explanations of firms surely provides important 
insights into factors that influence the boundaries of firms that are complementary 
to the specialization story told in this paper.  However, they do not give any 
account of why the boundaries of firms may changes over time.  In the next 
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section, I argue that opportunities for specialization advantages together with 
continuos learning in coordination within the boundaries of firms provides 
opportunities for continuos changes in the boundary of firms, thus adding a 
dynamic element to the economics of organization. 
 
 
IV. Make or Buy Decisions: 
Taking Advantage of the Division of Labor 
Coase (1937) explains why market and firms co-exists in a specialized economy. 
But after having established a reason for the existence of firms, Coase goes on to 
apply transaction costs analysis to determine the boundaries of firms.  He argues 
that there are increasing costs to organizing more transaction within a firm and 
that this explains why not all transactions are carried out in one big firm. When 
increasing marginal costs of management leave room for other firms to come into 
existence, different subsets of production tasks will be organized in different firms. 
 Coase (1937) did not investigate the factors that would make the costs of 
organizing a particular subset of tasks lower for some firms than for others. 
However, such an analysis is important to make or buy decisions, because these 
kinds of decisions are seldom a question of making a choice between either a firm 
or open market transactions, but of organizing a subset of production tasks within 
one firm rather than another firm.  In fact, Coase (1991) argues that  ”… if one is to 
explain the institutional structure of production in the system as a whole it is 
necessary to uncover the reasons why the costs of organizing particular activities 
differs among firms” (p.73), and these costs, according to Coase, “… may depend 
on the other activities that the firms are undertaking (p.67). 24  
                                                 
24 Coase (1937) mentions “… increasing opportunity costs due to the failure of entrepreneurs to 
make the best use of the factor of production” (p.23) as one of the reasons why there is a limit to the 
efficient size of a firm but not why some firms are more efficient in carrying out certain activities 
rather than other activities. Coase assumes that there are increasing opportunity costs of expanding 
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  A more in-depth understanding of why firms differ with respect to their costs 
of organizing different activities is important to the analysis of the "make or buy" 
decisions of firms.  If firms are not equally good at coordinating the same types of 
tasks, this should influence where the boundaries of firms are placed. The 
arguments presented earlier suggests that learning by doing in production and 
coordination results in different abilities and thus different costs among firms with 
respect to the organization of different kinds of tasks.  Make or buy decisions of 
firms must reflect these endogenous changes in production and coordination costs 
as employees and managers learn in production and coordination.   
 Based on the arguments presented earlier, the importance of learning in 
coordination depends on the extent and complexity of technological 
interdependencies in production activities. If specialization creates strong 
technological interdependencies, there will be advantages from learning to 
coordinate which favor organization within the boundaries of firms, at least until 
sufficient experimentation have resulted in the delineation of specific rights in 
manners which deals with these interdependencies. 
 The costs of organizing the interdependent tasks of course also needs to be 
considered when deciding on make or buy. These costs consists in increasing 
marginal management costs and bygone opportunities for taking advantage of 
further specialization in other tasks until coordination costs with the already 
obtained degrees of labor specialization have been reduced. Since accumulation of 
                                                                                                                                                     
the boundaries of a firm  because  “… the costs of losses through mistakes will increase with an 
increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the 
transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices. As more transactions are 
organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the transactions would tend to be either 
different in kind or in different places” (p.25). Managers, in other words, have limited capacity to 
“discover the relevant prices” and this increases mistakes as more and more dissimilar transactions 
are organized in a firm (Richardson (1972) has a very similar argument for the boundaries of firms). 
Clearly, some of the problems of limited capacity of managers may be solved by delegation and 
selective intervention. However, as explained by Williamson (1985) there are unavoidable side 
effects of moving transactions into a hierarchy. According to Williamson these costs may not be off 
set by gains from reduced transaction costs unless some degree of assets specificity is involved. In 
my opinion the losses from integration may also be off-set by the flexibility afforded by the 
employment contract with respect to  selective  intervention in activities. However, in order to 
efficiently delegate responsibility a manager needs experience 
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experience in coordination is often local and not transferable (except, possibly, at 
high costs) firms tend to persistently differ in their capabilities and this may 
explain a certain path dependency in the kind of activities firms undertake.  In 
other words, it may be difficult for firms to buy the services they produce in house 
cheaper from suppliers (cf. also the analysis in Langlois and Robertson 1995). 
 Accumulation of experience in coordination may explain some of the cost 
differences between firms, but this is not the entire explanation. A different reason 
may be found in the fact that there are also advantages of specializing in 
knowledge (Loasby 1999). Managers in firms then may posses different scientific 
and technological knowledge and therefore have different abilities to perform 
experiments in coordination. 
 This explanation is in line with Demsetz (1991) who also argues that firms are 
not perfect substitutes in production of goods and services.  According to Demsetz 
firms are specialized production entities each holding a different subset of the 
production knowledge needed to produce a consumption good.  For specialization 
in knowledge to be productive, specialists need to be able to take advantage of 
other specialists’ knowledge. Within firms coordination between specialists with 
different kinds of knowledge is achieved by giving orders. Following Demsetz, this 
is efficient because otherwise each specialist would have to learn what all other 
specialists already know.  The boundaries of firms are shaped by the relative costs 
and advantages of putting specialized knowledge to use by means of order-giving 
or by means of selling goods accompanied by instruction on uses.  The latter is 
advantageous when the best use of an asset does not strongly depend on it being 
used at a particular time and place.  
 Giving orders and producing goods embodying specialized knowledge is 
thus two different way of economizing with the costs of transferring knowledge. 
This explanation indicates that a decision to make or buy must also depend on the 
trade-off between taking advantage of low costs experimentation within the 
boundaries of a firm and taking advantage of specialized knowledge located in 
other firms. 
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 Finally, socially developed norms, rules and routines also reduce costs of 
coordination. Norms and routines make the behavior of others more predictable 
thus reducing the need for information required for the coordination of actions 
(Heiner 1983). In the terminology of property rights, norms and routines can be 
said to act as self-enforcing constraints on use rights. Such norms and routines 
certainly also play a great role in determining the costs of coordination in different 
firms and the decision to make rather than to buy may often be grounded on 
superior, non-imitable and non transferable routines which aids coordination in 
production. Norms and routines are not confined to firms; they may as well evolve 
as means of coordinating actions between independent contractors such as for 
example two different firms. In that case they also reduce costs of market 
transactions. 
Firms need not have full information about all the interdependencies between 
tasks before they decide to buy rather than to make. Some of the experimental 
activities needed to improve the effective working of technologies can be 
organized by means of, for example, joint ventures, strategic alliances, complex 
long-term contracts, etc. In some of these arrangements the parties rely more on the 
use of prices and negotiations and in some more on directions as means of 
coordination. However, what distinguishes these arrangements from internal 
organization of the transactions is that they are based on agreements between 
legally independent agents ⎯ thus, the analysis in this paper of the choice between 
firm and market applies also to the analysis of the choice between firms and 
interfirm arrangements. The legally independent parties to an interfirm 
arrangement will have to reach an agreement on the terms of corporation and this 
often require that they possess some knowledge/beliefs about what the proper 
procedures are for the experimental activities. The choice between the various 
arrangements therefore must depend on the knowledge/beliefs the parties have of 
the relevant procedures for the completion of the experimental learning process 




I have argued that learning in coordination within firms should be centered on 
ways of discovering the true opportunity costs of the use of assets where prices fail 
to provide the proper information.  There are many reasons why price information 
fails to indicate these opportunity cost; I have focused on one in particular − the 
increasing interdependence among various tasks which follows from increased 
specialization in tasks.  I have argued that a high degree of interdependence may 
make it impossible for managers ex ante to specify rights over assets and labor in 
such a way that that each sub-task fits optimally to all other tasks carried out.  
 For example, the problem of defining an optimal sequence of task in a 
complex systems of production may require more calculation capacity than is 
available in a supercomputer (Galloway 1996)25.  In such cases improvements in 
allocation of rights require experimentation in the sequencing of tasks, which in 
turn requires sequential re-delineation and reallocation of specific use rights 
among those carrying out the various tasks.  Managed coordination is likely to be 
less costly relative to arm-length bargaining partly because order-taking saves 
bargaining costs, partly because some specialized technological knowledge may be 
required in order to discover the opportunity costs (or shadow prices) of various 
subdivisions of tasks and the respective allocation of rights.    
 Increasing division of labor in production influences the boundaries of firms 
by creating opportunities for economic gains from learning to coordinate 
technologically interdependent tasks. However, since there are increasing marginal 
costs of coordinating more specialized tasks within the boundaries of a firm it may 
sometime be advantageous to out-source interdependent tasks in order to take 
advantage of further specialization in other tasks. Finally, the knowledge acquired 
in experimenting with coordination together with advantages of specialization in 
                                                 
25 In describing the problem of scheduling batches in a 5 stage production process, Galloway (1996) 
writes “[t]he best schedule is the one which minimizes this idle time. Unfortunately, the only way 
to find the best schedule is by trial and error, and whit 20 batches there are 1.8x1018 possible 
schedules. This problem is too large even for modern computers, so a simplifying assumption is 
frequently used (p.64).  
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scientific and technical knowledge may explain the relative advantages of firms in 
organizing some particular tasks and these advantages must also be taken into 
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